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TORTURE AND CONTRACT *

Laura A. Dickinson t

This symposium has raised important questions about the problem
of torture and, in particular, the use of torture in the so-called "War on Terror." In considering this problem, I would like to focus on an aspect of the
issue that has only recently received popular and scholarly attention, but
that is likely to have profound implications: the privatization of military
functions, and specifically, the privatization of torture. Such privatization
may, at first blush, seem to render it more difficult to hold human rights
abusers accountable because private actors might not be deemed subject to
various international human rights instruments that were initially drafted
primarily with states in mind. Yet, while the extensive outsourcing of torture to private military contractors is certainly a cause for serious concern, it
is my perhaps controversial claim that such outsourcing may not provide as
serious an impediment to accountability as it may at first seem. Indeed,
abuses by private contractors may actually be more readily subject to legal
sanction than abuses by official governmental actors. Nevertheless, I do
believe that scholars and policymakers need to look beyond simply the formal instruments of international human rights law and consider alternative
modes of accountability as well, such as the use of contractual provisions
and internal institutional structures. These alternative modes of accountability harness the potential of the government contracts that are the very engine
of privatization to help deter and prevent torture and other abuses.
Scholars have written extensively about the phenomenon of privatization in the United States.' Increasingly, prisons, schools, healthcare, and
* Presented at the War Crimes Research Symposium: "Torture and the
War on Terror" at
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Oct. 7, 2005.
t Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law.

For example, some scholars have extolled the cost savings that privatization
may bring, see, e.g., Simon Domberger & Paul Jensen, Contracting Out by the
Public Sector: Theory, Evidence, Prospects, 13 OxFoRD REv. ECON. POL'Y 67, 7275 (1997), while others have expressed deep misgivings, arguing that privatization
threatens to erode legal and democratic accountability. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich,
State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DuKE L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (contending that prison privatization
threatens to erode fundamental public values such as the humane treatment of inmates and the integrity of the incarceration system). Such scholars worry that, be-
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welfare programs are being run by private companies, and scholars have
raised concerns about the degree to which outsourcing results in reduced
legal accountability for abuses committed by contractors. 2 Legal realist arguments notwithstanding, constitutional scrutiny is typically applied only to
state actors. Thus, privatization often threatens to remove historically public
functions from constitutional oversight.
In the international sphere, we likewise see an increasing turn to
private contractors who are engaging in what we might think of as core
governmental functions. For example, even within the military, private actors are performing more and more functions.3 In the Abu Ghraib prison in
Iraq, where detainees were tortured and abused, the individuals involved in
the torture included not only members of the military, but private contractors hired to do the interrogation and translation. 4 This kind of military privatization, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. In the United States, although our government still does not contract out direct combat functions,
we are increasingly turning to private actors to provide logistical support to
those in combat on the battlefield as well as to aid in strategic planning and

cause private actors are usually not subject to the constitutional and administrative
law norms that apply to governments, any purported efficiency gains from privatization may come at the cost of losing important public values. See, e.g., Gillian E.
Metzger, Privatizationas Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 1374-76 (2003)
(arguing that privatization limits the reach of constitutional norms and proposing a
revival of the nondelegation doctrine as a means of applying these norms to a variety of privatized governmental activities). Finally, an emerging middle ground position embraces privatization while seeking new mechanisms for extending public
values through contract, democratic participation, and other modes of accountability. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 549 (2000) (arguing that contract can be a tool for extending public law
values to a variety of settings in which the government enters into agreements with
private entities to provide services);

ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY
DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM 137-81 (2004) (arguing

that, while privatization has helped create a "democracy deficit," new opportunities
have also emerged for promoting democratic accountability through enhanced
transparency and citizen participation).
2 Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and PoliticalAccountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.

1507, 1508 (2001).
3 P.W. Singer, The Contract the MilitaryNeeds to Break, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2004, at

B3 ("More than 20,000 private contractors are working for the U.S. government in Iraq,
performing a wide range of military functions.").

4 Id. ("Sixteen of the 44 incidents of abuse the Army's latest reports say happened at Abu Ghraib involved private contractors outside the domain of both the
U.S. military and the U.S. government.").
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tactical advice. 5 Other states such as Sierra Leone have used private contractors to engage in direct combat, 6 and international organizations have
weighed the possibilities of using private contractors to perform peacekeeping functions. 7 States and international organizations are also turning to8
private non-profit and for-profit entities to deliver all forms of foreign aid 9
and even to undertake diplomatic tasks such as peacekeeping negotiations.
Moreover, if we see the principles of the recent Supreme Court decision
Rasul v. Bush'0 applied broadly so that there is U.S. judicial review of governmental detention facilities anywhere in the world, it is not far-fetched to
think that we might see an increasing turn to privately run detention facilities using private contractors for supervision and interrogation in order to
avoid U.S. constitutional oversight.
Because many international human rights are framed as rights
against state overreaching, the turn to private actors might seem to present a
similar problem of legal accountability in the international sphere as it does

domestically. For example, because torture is defined as abuse committed
by official actors," one might think that a "state action" problem analogous
to the domestic constitutional one exists under international human rights
law.
Yet, for a variety of reasons, this problem proves not to be as
significant with respect to military privatization as it does in roughly
analogous domestic contexts, such as prison privatization. Indeed, the same
U.S. courts that would apply a narrow conception of the state action
doctrine in domestic cases against contractors appear to be willing to impute

5 See generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED
MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003).
6 See Abraham McLaughlin, Guns for Hire Thrive in Africa, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Mar. 15, 2004, at 6, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0315/p06s03-woaf.html.
7 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 5, at 182-86.
8

See, e.g., BEYOND UN SUBCONTRACTING: TASK-SHARING WITH REGIONAL SECURITY

ARRANGEMENTS AND SERVICE-PROVIDING NGOs (Thomas G. Weiss ed. 1998) [hereinafter
UN SUBCONTRACTING]; Ian Smillie, At Sea in a Sieve?: Trends and Issues in the Relationship Between Northern NGOs and Northern Governments, in STAKEHOLDERS: GOVERNMENTNGO PARTNERSHIPS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, at 7 (Ian Smillie & Henny Helmich
eds., 1999).
9 See, e.g., James Larry Taulbee & Marion V. Creekmore, Jr., NGO Mediation: The
CarterCenter, in MITIGATING CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF NGOs 156 (Henry F. Carey & Oliver
P. Richmond eds., 2003).
10 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
1 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention] (defining torture as only acts that are committed "by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.").
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state action in civil suits brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act12 to
redress violations of international human rights law.' 3 Moreover, acts of
torture committed by private contractors might draw criminal prosecutions
and civil suits under ordinary domestic law. 14 Thus, avenues for legal
accountability may actually be greater than are available against official
governmental actors. 15
Moreover, even apart from legal accountability, there are alternative
modes of accountability that have significant potential in the privatization
context. Using the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal as a case study, this
essay will discuss ways in which accountability mechanisms can be contractually mandated, as well as ways in which the institutional cultures of various private contractors can be harnessed or changed to increase compliance
with international legal norms, and specifically the prohibition of torture.
At Abu Ghraib, U.S. military personnel responsible for detention
operations abused detainees by forcing them to strip and undergo acts of
sexual humiliation, threatening them with dogs, applying electric shocks,
subjecting them to mock executions, exposing them to severely cold
weather, beating them, nearly suffocating them, and, in some cases, killing
them. 16 Private employees operating under contract with the Department of
the Interior as interrogators and translators participated in the abuse
alongside uniformed military personnel and reportedly directed some of the
activities. 17 Such acts clearly violated multiple norms embodied in both
international and domestic law, and specifically the norm prohibiting
torture. 8
12
13

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the

Problem of Accountability under InternationalLaw, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 137, 188
nn.232-33 (2005).
14 See id.
at 188-89.
See id.at 182-89.
See MAJ. GEN. ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY
POLICE BRIGADE, at 16-17 [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT]; FINAL REPORT OF THE
'"
16

INDEPENDENT. PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 13 (2004); U.S. DEP'T OF
THE ARMY, INSPECTOR GEN., DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION at 19-20 (2004); LT. GEN.
ANTHONY R. JONES & MAI. GEN. GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU
GHRAI1 DETENTION FACILITY AND THE 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 68-95 (2004)
[hereinafter FAY REPORT].
17 FAY REPORT, supra note 16, at 131-35; TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 16, at 48.
18 Under international law, the abuses could be characterized as torture; cruel, inhuman, or

degrading treatment; or war crimes. See Torture Convention, supra note 11, at arts. 1, 16;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art 147,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilians Convention]; Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 7(2)(a), 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter ICC Statute]. The acts might also constitute crimes against humanity, if the
abuses were "widespread or systematic" and committed "pursuant to... a State or organiza-
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Yet, international law scholars have not sufficiently focused on possible means of preventing and punishing such acts of privatized torture, and
the domestic U.S. literature on privatization may provide a useful set of
responses that has been largely overlooked. To begin with, in considering
the question of accountability under international law, we need to recognize
that it's not as if state actors are always held accountable. Indeed, international law has often been criticized as having relatively weak enforcement
mechanisms. While this fact may not be cause for celebration, it does serve
to remind us that we do not lose quite as much with respect to accountability when we privatize in the international sphere as we do when, for example, we privatize domestically. But more importantly, we should understand
that there are forms of accountability that inhere in the privatized relationship itself. In other words, there are what might be called alternative accountability mechanisms contained in the relationship between governments
(and international organizations) and private contractors.
International law scholars have not, to date, focused extensively on
such alternative mechanisms. Rather, the response to the problem of privatization has usually been normative. With each wave of non-state actorssuch as guerrilla movements,' 9 terrorists, 20 non-governmental organizations, 21 and corporations 22-international law practitioners and scholars
have advocated an expansion of international law norms to apply to each
group. Thus, scholars and practitioners have argued either that states should
(by treaty or customary international law) develop new norms that apply
directly to these categories of non-state actors, or that any "state action"
requirements contained in existing norms (again either in treaties or customary international law) should be interpreted expansively to apply to nontional policy ... ." Id. at art. 7. In addition, the acts alleged would likely constitute offenses
under U.S. law, which directly prohibits the international crimes of torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340
(2000), and war crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000), and which also criminalizes assault, murder, manslaughter, and maiming. Finally, the acts are crimes under Iraqi law. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 7 § 2 (June 10, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org
/regulations/index.html#Orders (adding prohibition on torture and cruel and inhuman treatment to Iraqi criminal code), and U.S. military law. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2000) (forbidding "cruelty and maltreatment").
'9 See, e.g., Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol II: History and Scope, 33 AM. U. L. REV.
29, 30-33 (1983).
20
See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law,
and the Law ofArmed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 675, 756-57 (2004).
21 See, e.g., Math Noortmann, Non-State Actors in International Law, in NON-STATE
ACTORS ININTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

71-72 (Bas Arts et al. eds., 2001).

See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 526-30 (2001); see also David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger,
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regardto Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2003).
22
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state actors in a broad range of contexts. At the same time, these scholars
and practitioners have tended to focus on the need for courts and tribunalsin many cases new ones-to apply and interpret these norms.
While this approach is important and useful because it results in the
articulation of norms in the international sphere, ultimately it can only have
a limited effect. After all, even if the proposed courts and tribunals are established and fully functioning, and even if they expand the norms of international law to apply to the broad range of privatized action, these tribunals
will never have the capacity to hold more than a limited number of individuals (and groups) accountable. A corresponding focus on alternative
modes of accountability is thus essential.
International law scholars and practitioners have not generally focused on these alternative modes of accountability in part because they tend
to frame the issue of privatization quite broadly. Accordingly, they have
usually addressed the question as one concerning the rise of "non-state actors" more generally, rather than "privatization" specifically. This is a crucial point, because it has meant that less attention has been paid to a key
facet of privatization that makes it different from, say, the rise of guerrilla
movements. Privatization as a specific phenomenon involves an increasing
contractual relationship between governments (or international organizations) and private actors. And, as U.S. administrative law scholars have
suggested, there may be alternative modes of accountability that inhere in
the privatized relationship itself. 23 These domestic scholars have not, however, considered the privatization of foreign affairs functions. Accordingly,
I have been working over the past couple of years to open a dialogue between international law scholars and domestic administrative law scholars
concerning privatization and public law accountability. 24
So, what are some of the alternative mechanisms for holding private
actors accountable in the international sphere, beyond applying expanded
international law norms in international courts and tribunals? First, we could
think more about the contracts themselves and the extent to which these
contracts could be used as a mode of accountability. Second, we could look
at the ways in which internal institutional cultures might affect the
willingness and ability of private organizations to follow international law
and ways we might change and affect those cultures over time to enhance
accountability.

23

See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The PrivateRole in Public Governance,75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543

(2000).

See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 35 YALE J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming 2006); Dickinson, supra note 13; see also Public Values/Private Contract, in
OUTSOURCING THE U.S. (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., Harvard Univ. Press, forthcoming 2006).
24

2006]

TORTURE AND CONTRACT

A. CONTRACT
Turning to contract, there are a number of different mechanisms
that could be used to ensure that privatized activities are carried out in accordance with international norms. I have used as a case study all of the
publicly available contracts that the U.S. government has negotiated in Iraq,
but the principles would apply to other types of contracts negotiated by
states or international organizations with contractors providing a variety of
foreign affairs functions.
First, the contracts themselves could explicitly require that the contractors obey international human rights and humanitarian law. This may
seem like an obvious point, but in the contracts that I have examined, none
contained specific provisions requiring contractors to obey international
human rights and humanitarian law.
Second, the contracts could explicitly require the contractors to
receive training in international human rights and humanitarian law. Again,
none of the publicly available Iraq contracts appears to require such
training.
Third, provisions could be made for increased monitoring of the
contracts, both by government monitors-the contract officers and
ombudspersons within the government-and outside for-profit and nonprofit organizations who could be empowered under the contracts to provide
monitoring.
Fourth, the contracts could include more concrete performance
benchmarks. This is probably particularly useful in the foreign aid context
and has to some degree been implemented, particularly with regard to
development aid.
Fifth, the contracts could require self-evaluation by contractors.
Contractors could thus be required to assess their own performance as a way
of enhancing accountability.
Sixth, contracts could include terms allowing the government (or
international organization) to take over the contract by degrees and ultimately terminate the contract for failure to observe international human
rights and humanitarian law norms. Many of the U.S. Iraq contracts do have
provisions for complete termination, but they are very rarely exercised because government officials tend to be reluctant to impose such a severe
sanction. Indeed, the contractor whose employees were implicated in the
Abu Ghraib abuse not only was not terminated; its contract was actually
expanded. It is important that governments (and international organizations)
be encouraged to invoke termination provisions when contractors fall short.
But even without full termination of the contractors, graduated government
(or international organization) takeover could be a less draconian (and
therefore more palatable) alternative.
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Finally, the contracts could provide for enhanced whistleblower
protections and third-party beneficiary suit provisions. For instance, those
who receive aid or those who are subject to contractor security action might
be able to make claims under the contracts for non-compliance with
international human rights and humanitarian law norms.
Of course, these compliance mechanisms are necessarily only as
good as the quality of the monitoring in question and, perhaps more to the
point, the willingness of domestic or international actors to seek judicial
enforcement at the back end if these norms are not observed. But, significantly, these contract-based mechanisms are no weaker than the existing
formal transnational/international court system, and at least they have the
benefit of opening up the possibility of legal enforcement regardless of
whether or not there is state action and to provide the foundation for legal
action in domestic, as well as international, fora.
B. INTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Internal institutional accountability is another under-explored mode
of accountability that can be used to promote the implementation of
international law norms in an increasingly privatized world.
First, contracts could seek to harness the distinctive institutional
cultures of various forms of contracting parties. For example, non-profit
organizations, for-profit corporations, religious organizations, and governmental organizations each have specific institutional norms and cultures that
make them more likely to obey certain norms and less likely to obey others.
Such institutional cultures could be considered in the contracting process.
Second, professional standardization and accreditation could be encouraged. Accreditation of contractors, for example, could encourage an
ethic of professionalism within the industry. Contracts and the courts could
then use professional standards as benchmarks for interpreting compliance.
Finally, internal institutional sanctions could be harnessed and used
more effectively. Demotion, firing, and other forms of shaming or non-legal
sanctions that have social meaning within institutions could be brought to
bear on individual actors to a greater degree. For example, within the military, a hierarchical organization in which rank and status are important, demotion and firing are sanctions that are very strongly felt. These kinds of
sanctions could be used more effectively.

Of course, there may well be resistance to the proposals that I have
suggested. First, one might argue that such reforms would remove some of
the purported efficiency gains that privatization arguably provides. It should
be noted, however, that the jury is still out on whether or not privatization
does in fact result in efficiency gains. Moreover, to the extent that increased
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oversight and professionalization results in less corruption and waste, these
reforms might actually save money. Second, some might suggest that governments are pursuing privatization precisely to avoid the type of accountability mechanisms I am suggesting and would therefore never be effective
monitors of contract compliance. However, governments are not monolithic
entities, and it is important to develop proposals that will empower those
within government bureaucracies who are interested in compliance with
international norms. In addition, governments often respond to pressure
from international organizations, other governments, or non-governmental
organizations, and so these entities should at least consider advocating the
alternative accountability mechanisms suggested in this essay. Finally, one
might think that the government contractors themselves would resist the
reforms. However, we should not underestimate the bargaining power that a
state has when doling out such large and lucrative contracts. In addition,
many private military contractors are actually seeking more oversight and
professionalization in order to differentiate themselves from rogue outfits
that are viewed as hurting the reputation of the industry as a whole.
In the end, more important than the pros and cons of the specific
proposals I have mentioned is the need to consider such questions in the
first place. International law scholars, advocates, and policy makers-who
tend to focus on the extension of international law norms to cover private
actors and the expansion of formal court-like mechanisms to hold such actors accountable-should spend at least as much time advocating for ways
to use alternative accountability mechanisms that derive specifically from
the fact of privatization itself.

